ELECTION LAW—DRAFT COMMITTEES: A LOOPHOLE IN THE FEDERAL ELECTION LAWS—Federal Election Commission v. Florida for Kennedy Committee, 681 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir. 1982) by Plumb, Kenneth R.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 6 6 (1983-1984)
Issue 2 Article 9
1-1-1983
ELECTION LAW—DRAFT COMMITTEES: A
LOOPHOLE IN THE FEDERAL ELECTION
LAWS—Federal Election Commission v. Florida
for Kennedy Committee, 681 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir.
1982)
Kenneth R. Plumb
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kenneth R. Plumb, ELECTION LAW—DRAFT COMMITTEES: A LOOPHOLE IN THE FEDERAL ELECTION LAWS—Federal
Election Commission v. Florida for Kennedy Committee, 681 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir. 1982), 6 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 555 (1983),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol6/iss2/9
ELECTION LAW-DRAFT COMMITTEES: A LOOPHOLE IN THE 
FEDERAL ELECTION LAws-Federal Election Commission v. Florida 
For Kennedy Committee, 681 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir. 1982). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal Election Commission v. Floridafor Kennedy Committee 1 
involved Federal Election Commission (FEC) investigation into the 
activities of the Florida for Kennedy Committee (the Committee),2 
one of nine "draft-Kennedy" organizations3 whose purpose was to 
convince Senator Edward M. Kennedy to declare his candidacy for 
the 1980 Democratic nomination for President.4 The purpose of the 
investigation was to determine if the Committee was operating 
within the contribution guidelines of the Federal Election Campaign 
Act (FECA).5 The Committee, however, disputed the FEC's juris­
diction arguing that draft committees, such as the Committee, were 
not political committees under the Act. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Committee's inter­
pretation and held that draft committees were not political commit­
tees within the meaning of the FECA and, as such, the activities of 
the Committee fell outside the jurisdiction of the FEC.6 Thus, the 
1. 681 F.2d 1281 (lIth Cir. 1982). 
2. The Florida for Kennedy Committee (the Committee) was established by a 
group of Florida citizens who in mid-May of 1979 formed an association to demonstrate 
and encourage support for Senator Kennedy in Florida. Their primary goal was to infiu­
ence the outcome of a nonbinding straw poll to be held at the November Florida State 
Democratic Convention for which they accepted contributions and made expenditures. 
As a result of these activities, the Committee voluntarily registered as a political commit­
tee with the FEC and submitted regular contribution and expenditure reports. Brief of 
Appellant at 2-3, Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d 
1281 (11th Cir. 1982). 
3. The FEC defines a draft committee as an "unauthorized committee disavowed 
by the individual whose candidacy the committee promotes." 1979 FED. ELECTION 
COMM'N ANN. REp. 7. 
4. Although he officially announced his candidacy on October 29, 1979, Senator 
Kennedy had expressly disavowed the activities of the Committee by a letter dated June 
8, 1979. Brief of Appellant at 2-3, Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy 
Comm., 681 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir. 1982). 
5. The Federal Election Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified 
as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1982». 
6. F1oridafor Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d at 1282. The same result was reached by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Federal Elec­
tion Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981), 
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Committee and all other draft committees are not subject to any of 
the requirements and restrictions, such as contribution limitations, 
imposed on political committees by the FECA. This note will ad­
dress how the court, in determining that draft committees are not 
political committees under the Act, has provided a mechanism, by 
which the purpose, intent and effectiveness of the campaign finance 
laws, can be circumvented. 
II. FACTS 
On July 17, 1979, the Committee requested an advisory opinion 
from the FEC concerning the applicability of the Act's contribution 
and expenditure limits to draft committees.7 The FEC ruled that 
because Senator Kennedy was not a candidate, the $5,000 individual 
contribution limitation for "other political committees" applied. 8 
Had the Committee been supporting an announced candidate, how­
ever, such as Ronald Reagan or Jimmy Carter, the individual contri­
bution limitation of $1,000 would have applied.9 
Of further concern to the Carter-Mondale Presidential Commit­
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). See infra notes 99-111 and accompanying text. See 
also Ifshin & Warin, Litigating the 1980 Presidential Election, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 485, 506­
13 (1982). 
7. 1979-40 FEC Advisory Opinion 1-3 (Aug 17, 1979), summarized in 1979 FED. 
ELECTION COMM'N ANN. REp. 78-79. Specifically, the Committee asked three questions: 
l. May [the Committee] receive monies in excess of $1,000 but not more than 
$5,000 per calendar year, from an individual contributor, or other political 
committee, to be expended for "raising issues relevant to the 1980 Presidential 
Election and to cause Senator Kennedy to become a candidate for the Office of 
President?" 
2. Is there any limitation upon the amount of monies that [the Committee] 
may expend to cause the selection of delegates to the November, 1979 State 
party convention, who agree with the issues raised by [the Committee] and 
would express their preference for Kennedy in the non-binding straw ballot at 
the convention? 
3. In the event the answer to Question I is in the affirmative, what, if any, 
effect would the making of said contributions have on the right of the individu­
als to make contributions (a) to Senator Kennedy if he becomes a candidate; or 
(b) to an authorized committee; or (c) directly or indirectly on behalf of such 
candidate? 
Id at 2. The FEC is required to issue an advisory opinion to any person who submits a 
request for information concerning the Act's provisions. 2 U.S.C. § 437f(a)(I) (1982). 
8. 1979-40 FEC Advisory Opinion 1,2-3 (Aug. 17, 1979), summarized in 1979 FED. 
ELECTION COMM'N ANN. REP. 78-79. The FEC also answered the second question in the 
negative. Id at 3. The Commission refused to answer the third question because of its 
hypothetical nature. Id 
9. 2 U.S.C. § 44la(a)(l)(A) (1982). Thus, an individual could contribute a maxi­
mum amount of $1,000 to a committee supporting a candidate such as Jimmy Carter, but 
because a draft committee does not support an announced candidate, the limit is $5,000. 
557 1983) DRAFT COMMlrFEES 
tee was the fear that if the nine draft-Kennedy committees were 
found to be independent of each other, a $5,000 contribution could 
be made to each one without violating the FECA's contribution limi­
tations. tO Faced with this situation, on October 4, 1979, Carter­
Mondale filed a complaint with the FEC alleging that (I) the draft­
Kennedy groups were political committees under the Act; II (2) the 
nine draft-Kennedy committees l2 were affiliated l3 and therefore sub­
ject to an aggregate $5,000 contribution limitation; 14 and (3) the Ma­
chinists Non-Partisan Political League,IS the political arm of the 
International Association of Machinists, had exceeded the $5,000 
limitation by contributing over $33,000 to the allegedly affiliated 
political committees. 16 In response to this complaint, the FEC noti­
fied the Committee "that it had 'reason to believe'17 that violations 
Ifshin & Warin, supra note 6, at 508 n.162 (citing FEC Informational Letter 1976-20 
(Aug. 17, 1976». 
10. If, however, the committees were found to be affiliated they would be treated as 
a single committee and subject to the contribution limitations for single political commit­
tees. 2 U.S.c. § 441a(a)(5) (1982). 
11. Federal Election Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 
F.2d 380, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). 
12. Eight other political committees also were involved in the FEC subpoena: Cit­
izens for Democratic Alternatives in 1980; New Hampshire Democrats for Change; 
Democrats for Change in 1980; National Call for Kennedy; Illinois Citizens for Ken­
nedy; Committee for Alternatives to Democratic Presidential Candidate; Minnesota for a 
Democratic Alternative; and D.C. Committee for a Democratic Alternative. Brief for 
Appellee at 2 n.3, Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d 
1281 (11th Cir. 1982). 
13. Federal Election Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 
F.2d 380, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). See supra note 10. 
14. Federal Election Co"mm'n v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 
F.2d 380, 383 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). 
15. The Machinists Non-Partisan Political League (MNPL) represents what the 
Act terms a "separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corpora­
tion, labor organization, membership organization, cooperative, or cooperation without 
capital stock." 2 U.S.C. § 44lb(b)2(C) (1982). For purposes of making contributions 
MNPL is classified as a multicandidate political committee: "a political committee 
which has been registered under section 433 of [Title 2) for a period of not less than 6 
months, which has received contributions from more than 50 persons, and, except for any 
state political party organization, has made contributions to 5 or more candidates for 
Federal office. Id § 44la(a)(4). 
16. The Act provides that: "No multicandidate political committee shall make 
contributions-{c) to any other political committee in any calendar year which, in the 
aggregate, exceed $5,000." 2 U.S.c. § 44la(a)(2)(C) (1982). The $33,000 given by 
MNPL to the allegedly affiliated draft committees violated the $5,000 contribution limit 
because contributions to affiliated political committees are subject to the limits of a single 
political committee. See supra note 10. Similarly, the Committee would have violated 
the Act by knowingly accepting the excess MNPL contributions. 2 U.S.C. § 44 I a(f) 
(1982). 
17. The FEC cannot initiate an investigation on a complaint until it has made an 
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of the federal campaign laws had occurred."18 
Upon receipt of the FEC's notification, the Committee moved 
on November I, 1979 to dismiss the Carter-Mondale complaint ar­
guing that the "[Committee] was a draft committee and not a polit­
ical committee within the meaning of the Act"19 and, as such, none 
of the Act's reporting or contribution requirements were applicable 
to it.20 Before considering the Committee motion, the FEC, on No­
vember 5th, served the Committee with the subpoena which was the 
basis of the Committee's appeal.21 The FEC subsequently denied 
both the Committee motion that draft committees were not subject 
to the Act's restriction and a later Committee motion to quash the 
subpoena.22 Upon the Committee's refusal to comply with the sub­
poena, the FEe instituted the present action in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida.23 The Commit­
tee countered by seeking a plenary hearing24 to challenge the scope 
of the FEC's jurisdiction over draft groups.25 The District Court, 
however, "ruled that the subpoena enforcement proceeding was not 
the proper forum in which to challenge the FEC's jurisdiction or to 
initial "reason to believe" determination that a violation of the Act has occurred. 2 
U.S.c. § 437g(a)(2) (1982). An affirmative vote by four of the FEC's six voting members 
will satisfy the "reason to believe" test and the alleged violator must then be notified that 
such a determination has been made. fd. The FEC is then under a duty to conduct an 
investigation. fd. 
18. 681 F.2d at 1282. The Carter-Mondale committee complaint was subsequently 
amended on November 2, 1979. It provided additional information for the affi.liation 
claim and further alleged that Senator Kennedy had, in fact, become a candidate on 
September I, 1979, two months before his official announcement. Federal Election 
Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d 380, 383-84 (D.C. Cir. 
1981), cerro denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). 
19. 681 F.2d at 1282. 
20. fd. 
21. fd. at 1282-83. The subpoena requested the Committee and its organizers to 
tum over all documents and materials concerning its involvement with the MNPL and 
other draft-Kennedy groups. fd. at 1283 n.3. 
22. fd. at 1282-83. 
23. Federal Election Comm'n V. Florida for Kennedy Committee, 492 F.Supp. 587 
(S.D. Fla. 1980). See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(6)(A) (1982) (enforcement provision for viola­
tions of the Act). 
24. Relying on the first amendment's protection of free speech and association, the 
Committee claimed that (I) the subpoena was unconstitutional, and (2) the presence of 
the constitutional questions involved required the FEC to fully demonstrate its jurisdic­
tion over draft groups before the subpoena could be enforced. 492 F.Supp. at 591. Al­
though the district court determined that some unintended infringement of first 
amendment rights might occur from enforcement of the subpoena, it reasoned that the 
FEC's need for speedy investigations outweighed any potential infringement of the Com­
mittee's constitutional rights in this instance. fd. at 596-98. 
25. fd. at 591. The FEC has exclusive civil jurisdiction over the enforcement of 
the Act. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(I) (1982). 
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raise constitutional objections to the subpoena."26 The court subse­
quently enforced the subpoena on November 6, 1980, and the Com­
mittee's appeal was filed. 27 
III. 	 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FECA AND STATUTORY 
REGULATION OF POLITICAL COMMITTEES 
A. 	 Initial Attempts at Regulating Campaign Financing and Political 
Committees 
During the early 1900's, Congress28 and the public became in­
creasingly concerned about the presence of corruption in the electo­
ral process, particularly the connection between the alleged 
corruption and corporate wealth.29 This concern led to the adoption 
26. 681 F.2d at 1283. 
27. Id Favorable rulings enforcing FEC subpoenas in this investigation were also 
registered by the district courts in the other draft-Kennedy group cases. E.g., Federal 
Election Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 210 App. D.C. 267 
(D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); 
Federal Election Comm'n v. Citizens for Democratic Alternatives in 1980,210 App. D.e. 
284 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 655 F.2d 397 (D.e. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); 
Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Democrats for Change in 1980, No. 80-C-124 
(W.D. Wis. Apr. 24, 1980) (this group did not appeal the decision and chose instead to 
comply with the FEC subpoena). The other draft-Kennedy groups complied with the 
subpoena in the first instance. 1981 FED. ELECTIONS COMM'N ANN. REP. 24. 
Whether the Committee could properly contest the subpoena issue in an enforce­
ment proceeding was the first issue to be determined by the eleventh circuit. Federal 
Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d 1281, 1283 (I Ith Cir. 1982). 
The court noted that the FEC subpoena had "several characteristics that make it neces­
sary for the court to be certain of the FEC's investigative authority before enforcing it 
...." Id at 1284. See also Federal Election Commission v. Machinists Non-Partisan 
Political League, 655 F.2d 380, 386-90 (D.e. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). 
The FEC alleged that the "extra careful scrutiny" test attached to FEC subpoenas will 
seriously hamper the operation of the FEe. Petition for writ of Certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit at 14-15, Federal Election 
Commission v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). 
28. In hearings before the House Committee on the Election of the President in 
1905, one legislator described the purpose behind the early attempts at legislative regula­
tion of campaign finances: 
The idea is to prevent . . . the great railroad companies, the great insur­
ance companies, the great telephone companies, the great aggregations of 
wealth from using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly, to send members 
of the legislature to these halls in order to vote for their protection and the 
advancement of their interests against those of the public. 
THE PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, THE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE 54 (1976) (em­
phasis in original). 
29. One of the more suspect methods of campaign fund raising concerned the ef­
forts of Mark Hannah, the chairman of the Republican National Committee in 1896. 
Hannah set contribution quotas for banks, life insurance companies and other business 
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of the Tillman Act of 1907,30 which prohibited all direct corporate 
and national bank contributions to political committees and cam­
paigns regarding election to federal office. A second step, designed 
to curtail the corruption in federal elections, was the passage of the 
Federal Disclosure Act of 1910.31 This statute required all interstate 
political committees to report campaign contributions and 
expenditures.32 
Both the Tillman Act and the Federal Disclosure Act were in­
corporated into the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925,33 which 
represented the primary federal law on the subject of campaign 
finance. The Hatch Political Activities Act of 193934 was the first 
addition to the Corrupt Practices Act. The Hatch Act was enacted 
primarily to prohibit active political participation by federal employ­
ees, though several of its 1940 Amendments dealt with the issue of 
political committees. Specifically, the 1940 Amendments placed a 
$5,000 limit upon individual contributions to anyone political com­
mittee or on behalf of anyone candidate.35 Expenditures by polit­
ical committees were limited to 3 million dollars.36 
A final piece of legislation, the War Labor Disputes Act of 
1943,37 extended the contribution prohibition from banks and corpo­
organizations based on their ability to pay. For instance, the quota for banks was one­
fourth of one per cent of their capital. The net result was a campaign chest of about $3.5 
million for the Republic nominee William McKinley ($3 million coming from the New 
York City area) as opposed to only $675,000 for his counterpart William Jennings Bryan, 
This disparity was a major factor in McKinley's victory. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING 
POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM 47 (2d ed. 1980). 
30. Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (current version at 2 U.S.C. 
§ 44lb (1982». In part, the Act provided: 
That it shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organ­
ized by authority of any laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in 
connection with any election to any political office. It shall also be unlawful for 
any corporation whatever to make a money contribution in connection with any 
election at which Presidential or Vice-Presidential electors or a Representative 
in Congress is to be voted for or any election by any State legislature of a 
United States Senator .... 
Id. at ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864-65. 
31. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (repealed 1925). 
32. Id. at 36 Stat. 823-24. 
33. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of Feb. 28, 1925, ch.368, 43 Stat. 1070 (codified 
in scattered sections of 2, 18 U.S.C. (1970» (repealed 1972). 
34. Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (extended in Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 
640, 54 Stat. 767 (1940) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-27 (1982». 
35. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, § 13, 54 Stat. 767, 770-71. 
36. Id. at § 20, 54 Stat. 772. 
37. Act of June 25,1943, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167-68 (1943) (current version at 
2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(l) (1982». 
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rations to labor unions.38 All of the combined provisions discussed 
represent the basic structure of federal campaign regulations prior to 
the enactment of the FECA in 1971.39 
This basic structure, however, was totally ineffective in achiev­
ing comprehensive regulation of federal elections. One glaring loop­
hole in the scheme involved the definition of a political committee.40 
A political committee was defined as an entity that operated in more 
than one state or that operated as a branch or subsidiary of a na­
tional party.41 An individual could easily circumvent the Act's con­
tribution limitations by giving a maximum gift of $5,000 to an 
interstate political committee and then contribute additional funds, 
in an unlimited amount, to an intrastate committee. By virtue of its 
operation in only one state, an intrastate committee did not qualify 
as a political committee under the Act.42 Because most congres­
sional campaigns involved primarily intrastate committees, the statu­
tory restrictions had little effect on congressional elections.43 The 
provision limiting political committees to three million dollars in ex­
penditures was similarly ineffective. Once a political committee 
reached the limit, additional committees were formed until all avail­
able funds were utilized. Additionally, there were no expenditure 
limitations for primaries or conventions.44 
Many of the other provisions regulating political activity, partic­
ularly those restricting business and labor, were also easily bypassed 
orconstantly abused.45 For instance, the disclosure provisions were 
38. Recodified in the National Labor Relations Act.of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 
(1947) (codified at 29 U.S.c. §§ 141-197 (1976 & Supp. V 1981», the prohibition was 
expanded to apply to direct expenditures for primary elections, political conventions and 
caucuses. Id at § 304, 61 Stat. 159-60. 
39. For a detailed discussion of the legislation preceding the FECA, see generally, 
R. PEABODY, 1. BERRY, W. FRASURE & 1. GOLDMAN, To ENACT A LAW: CONGRESS AND 
CAMPAIGN FINANCING. (I972); Berry & Goldman, Congress andPublic Policy: A Study of 
the Federal Campaign Act of1971, 10 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 331 (1973). 
40. Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 345, 365 (1977); 
Note, Campaign Spending Controls Under the Federal Election Campaign Act of1971, 8 
COLUM. 1.L. & Soc. PROBS. 285, 288 (1972). 
41. 18 U.S.c. § 591 (1970)(repealed 1972). See infra note 56 and accompanying 
text for the amended definition of a political committee. 
42. Note, supra note 40 at 288 n.32. 
43. Id at 288. 
44. Id For example, in order to avoid the contribution and expenditure limita­
tions, the 1968 Democratic Presidential team of Humphrey-Muskie created more than 95 
different committees. D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR 
CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN AMERICA 45 (1975). 
45. For a detailed discussion of the methods used by labor and business to circum­
vent the contribution and expenditure restrictions, see Epstein, Corporations and Labor 
Unions in Electoral Politics, 425 ANNALS 33 (May, 1976). The author concludes that 
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similarly ineffective because candidates were only required to report 
contributions received and expenditures made "by him or any per­
son for him with his knowledge or consent."46 Candidates inter­
preted "any person" as not including their local or interstate 
committees and this interpretation was accepted by the Department 
of Justice. This acceptance was so widespread that several candi­
dates such as Senators Kennedy, Muskie, Bensten and Brock re­
ported having received no campaign contributions in 1970.47 
A final problem contributing to the ineffectiveness of the entire 
legislative scheme was the lack of enforcement. Since 1925, enforce­
ment of the Corrupt Practices Act resulted in only one prosecution48 
and no convictions.49 
Aside from the numerous loopholes and overall ineffectiveness 
of the pre-1971 legislation, several other factors existed that 
prompted Congress to institute new regulations governing campaign 
financing. One factor was evidenced by the dramatic increase in 
campaign related expenditures. 50 With the public becoming increas­
ingly alarmed over increased campaign expenditures, it became diffi­
cult for candidates to publicly go on record as opposing efforts to 
improve the system.51 Finally, an issue group entitled the National 
Committee for an Effective Congress outlined several of the initial 
proposals and helped insure the ultimate enactment of new legisla­
tion.52 From virtually every perspective the pre-I971 campaign laws 
were a nullity and "[b]oth candidates and the public [had] come to 
regard the law as a dead letter."53 
"[vJirtually no corporation or labor union that wished to do so was deterred de facto 
from making campaign contributions and expenditures." Id at 38. See also Pipefitters 
Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972) (discussing the history of the 
law on union contributions and expenditures and ultimately upholding the constitution­
ality of the educational expenditures made by the political action arm of unions and 
corporations as long as any contribution collected is voluntary in nature and these mon­
ies are separated from the organization's general treasury funds). 
46. Note, supra note 40 at 290 (quoting 2 U.S.c. § 246(a) (1970) (repealed 1972». 
47. Id at 290-91, 290 n.47. 
48. Id at 291. See Burroughs & Canon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934) 
(rejecting the violators claim that the disclosure provisions of the Act were 
unconstitutional). 
49. Berry & Goldman, supra note 39, at 333. 
50. Note, supra note 40, at 285 n.4. 
51. Expenditures increased from $200 million in 1964 to $300 million in the 1968 
campaign. Id This increase differed substantially from the $25 million increase in 1968 
over the cost of the 1964 elections. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 9. 
52. Berry & Goldman, supra note 39 at 334-35. 
53. Note, supra note 40 at 291. 
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B. 	 Implementation ofthe FECA and its Impact on Political 
Committees 
1. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
The FECA of 197154 is comprised of four Titles,55 with Title III 
the most important for purposes of this Note. In an effort to close 
the loopholes, Title III redefined a political committee as "any com­
mittee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives 
contributions or makes expenditures during a calender year in an 
aggregate amount exceeding $1,000 ...."56 In addition, both can­
didates and political committees were required to periodically file 
statements identifying all campaign contributions received over 
$100.57 The 1971 Act, however, did not establish contribution limi­
tations or an overall expenditure ceiling. 
2. 	 The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 
The 1974 Amendments58 dramatically altered the FECA of 
1971. There were two primary reasons for the substantial revision of 
the original Act. The first reason concerned the numerous abuses of 
campaign financing demonstrated in the Watergate affair. 59 Sec­
54. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.c. §§ 431­
455 (1982». 
55. Title I restricted the amount of money which could be used for media advertis­
ing. 47 U.S.C § 315 (1972) (this portion of the Act was later repealed by the 1974 amend­
ments). Title II limited the amount a candidate could contribute to his own campaign 
out of his or her family's personal funds, 18 U.S.c. § 608(a)(I) (1972) (repealed 1976), 
and contained a provision expressly allowing corporations and labor unions to establish 
separate segregated funds for political purposes. 18 U.S.c. § 610 (repealed 1976) (cur­
rent version at 2 U.S.C. § 44lb (1982». These expenditures were already being made 
under the guise of educational expenditures by the political action arms of unions and 
corporations. See supra note 45. Title IV repealed the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 
Pub. L. No. 506, 43 Stat. 1070 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18 U.S.C. (1970» 
(repealed 1972). 
56. This definition of a political committee remained the same in the Federal Elec­
tion Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 and 1976,2 U.S.C. § 43 I (d)(I 976), and thus, is 
the one utilized by the Floridafor Kennedy Comm. court. 681 F.2d at 1286. The defini­
tion was modified slightly under the 1979 Amendments. 2 U.S.c. § 431(4) (1982). 
57. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (1976). This amount was increased to $200 by the 1979 
amendments. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A), (5)(A) (1982). 
58. The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 
88 Stat. 1263 (1974). 
59. While the disclosure provisions of the Act did contribute to the discovery of the 
Watergate abuses, the mere presence of the extensive misconduct surrounding Nixon's 
1972 re-election campaign clearly showed that the present requirements were inadequate. 
D. AOAMANY & G. AGREE, supra note 44 at 5. The drive for reform was also spurred on 
by the public's reaction to Watergate. In 1965, a survey by the Research Center of the 
University of Michigan showed 71% of the respondents against the public financing of 
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ondly, a three judge district court inAmerican Civil Liberties Union v. 
Jennings60 declared several of the Act's provisions unconstitu­
tiona1.61 Congress' reconsideration of the FECA resulted in the con­
stitutional issue being mooted before the case reached the Supreme 
Court.62 
In response to the "orgy of big giving"63 which took place in the 
1972 Presidential campaign, Congress reinstated contribution limits 
in the 1974 Amendments. Individuals were limited to an annual 
contribution of $1,000 per candidate per election64 and $5,000 to 
political committees not affiliated with the candidate.65 Further­
more, an absolute limit of $25,000 was established as the aggregate 
amount that an individual could contribute to all candidates and 
political committees.66 
The Act also limited to $5,000 the amount that political commit­
tees could contribute to candidates or their campaigns. 67 Political 
federal elections. By contrast, Gallup polls taken in 1973 and 1974 displayed support for 
public financing by 65% and 67% margins respectively. Id. at 61 n.3. For a discussion of 
the many abuses of the 1972 campaign as a basis for upholding the FECA's major provi­
sions, see, Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839-40 nn. 36-38 (1975), rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 
I (1976). 
60. 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973) (three judge court), vacated as moot subnom. 
Staats v. American Civil Liberties Union, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975). 
61. Id. Because of the sponsorship requirements of the Act, the New York Times 
had rejected an advertisement proposed by the American Civil Liberties Union and 
other organizations expressing opposition to the Nixon Administration's proposed legis­
lation to limit court-ordered busing. The advertisement included an "Honor Roll" of 
102 congressmen and congresswomen who had previously opposed the antibusing policy. 
366 F. Supp. at 1043-44. The court first held that Title I § 104(b) of the FECA and its 
accompanying regulations, that required the media to determine whether a proposed ad­
vertisement had satisfied the Act's certification and identification requirements, estab­
lished impermissible prior restraints on open discussion of matters of public concern. Id. 
at 1050-51. Such restrictions are violative of the first amendment and, thus, unconstitu­
tional. Id. at 1054. 
The Jennings court found that the disclosure provisions of Title III of the Act were 
unconstitutional when applied to American Civil Liberties Union in the instant case. Id. 
at 1057. This aspect of the Jennings case will be discussed later in the note. See infra 
note 79 and accompanying text. 
62. Staats v. American Civil Liberties Union, 422 U.S. 1030, 1030-1031 (1975). 
63. D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, supra note 44, at 54. 
64. 2 U.S.c. § 44la(I)(A) (1982). Primaries, runoffs and general elections are con­
sidered separate elections except that the pre-nomination period in presidential cam­
paigns constitutes a single election. Id. § 43 I (l)(A), (D). 
65. Id. § 44la(I)(C). 
66. Id. § 44la(a)(3). 
67. Id. § 44la(a)(2)(A). The contribution limit .is $5,000 rather than the $1,000 
limitation for individuals as long as the committee meets certain requirements. See supra 
note IS. See generally Ifshin & Warin, supra note 6, at 492-95. Other changes in the 
1974 amendments included limitations on expenditures. Individuals were limited on the 
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committees, however, were not limited regarding the total or aggre­
gate amount that they could contribute to all candidates or commit­
tees in a given election. 
3. Buckley v. Valeo 
On almost the very day that the 1974 version of the Act went 
into effect, a major constitutional challenge68 was made in Buckley v. 
Valeo .69 The Court first determined that the regulation of monies 
used to generate political activity represented a regulation of speech 
and not conduct.70 Thus, the provisions of the Act limiting contribu­
tions and expenditures restrained the fundamentally protected areas 
of political expression and association. The Court required the dem­
onstration of a compelling governmental interest in order to with­
stand the necessary strict scrutiny involved in such first amendment 
issues.71 
The Court ultimately held that only the prevention of corrup­
tion, and the appearance of corruption, were significantly compelling 
to justify the contribution limitations.72 Even this governmental in-
amount they could independently spend in support of a candidate. Candidates were 
limited in. the amount which they or their authorized political committees could spend in 
their election effort. Id Limitations on expenditures by candidates refusing public sub­
sidies were declared unconstitutional restrictions on first amendment rights. Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 59 (1976). See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. The 1974 
revision of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1971 provided public fund­
ing for Presidential Candidates. Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 801, 85 Stat. 563 (codified at 
I.R.C. §§ 6096, 9001-9013 (West 1982). Also, in an effort to insure compliance with the 
FECA, the 1974 amendments created the Federal Election Commission (FEC). 2 U.S.c. 
§ 437(c} (1982). Until the creation of the FEC, the Justice Department was primarily 
responsible for enforcing the election laws. Ifshin & Warin, supra note 6 at 494 n.57. 
Finally, the 1974 amendments added to the disclqsure requirements of the 1971 Act with 
most of these changes designed to improve the reporting aspects of the Act. See gener­
ally, D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, supra note 44, at 92-3. The amendment required candi­
dates to designate a principle campaign committee which is responsible for reporting all 
financial transactions made on the candidate's behalf, including those of his political 
committees. 2 U.S.C. § 432(f) (1982). 
68. See generally, Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath, and Its Pros­
pects: The Constitutionality ofGovernment Restraints on Political Campaign Financing, 29 
VAND. L. REV. 1327 (1976). 
69. 424 U.S. I (1976). 
70. 424 U.S. at 17. The Buckley court's distinction was elaborated on by the Dis­
trict Court for the District of Columbia in Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 
(1980) (three judge court) affd per curiam hyan equally divided court, 455 U.S. 129 
(1982). 
71. 424 U.S. at 25. 
72. Id at 29. Limiting contributions serves to eliminate the subsequent "favors" or 
quid pro quos often involved when a large contributor donates a substantial sum to a 
potential office holder. Because the potential favors to large contributors and the public 
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terest, however, was not sufficient to permit a limitation on expendi­
tures.73 In addition, the court noted that the Act's expenditure 
limitations represented substantial restraints on the "quantity and 
diversity of political speech"74 as opposed to the contribution limita­
tions which entailed "only a marginal restriction upon the contribu­
tor's ability to engage in free communication."75 Thus, political 
committees are permitted to spend an unlimited amount in support 
of a particular candidate provided its expenditures are made inde­
pendently of the candidate's campaign.76 
With these initial determinations as a background, the Buckley 
court then discussed the definition of political committees under the 
Act.77 The specific context in which the Court defined political com­
perception of these practices tend to undermine the integrity of a representative democ­
racy, the prevention of this type of corruption represents a compelling governmental in­
terest substantial enough to overshadow first amendment restrictions. Id at 26-29. 
73. Id at 45. The court concluded that expenditures made without the candidate's 
cooperation and consent "may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign 
and indeed may prove counterproductive" to his efforts. Id at 47. Thus, large independ­
ent expenditures do not present the same type ofquidpro quo corruption identified with 
large contributors. Id at 46. But see, Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 
COLUM. L.R. 345,367-75 (1977) (expenditure limitations can be justified on self-govern­
ment, equality, and promotion of discussion grounds); Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The 
Constitutionality ofthe Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of1974, 1977 WIS. L. 
REv. 323, 340-44 (author proposes that the court's conclusion that independent expendi­
ture limitations posed no danger of corruption was incorrectly reasoned) .. 
74. 424 U.S. at 19. 
75. Id at 20-21. The Court's constitutional distinction can best be explained by 
classifying the two types of political participants as spenders and contributors. The for­
mer expresses himself directly and the latter, through his contributions, enables others to 
express his viewpoint. Expenditure limitations directly restrain the first amendment 
rights of spenders, substantially preventing them from speaking. In contrast, contribu­
tion limitations only marginally restrict the contributor from speaking, he can still ex­
press his views directly through expenditures. See Fleming, Regulation of Campaign 
Financing 1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AM. LAW 649, 656. 
76. The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 
90 Stat. 475, 479 (1976), defined what constitutes an independent expenditure as opposed 
to a contribution. Any expenditure made in "cooperation, consultation or concert with, 
or at the request or suggestion of a candidate, his authorized political committee or their 
agents" must be classified as a contribution. 2 U.S.c. § 44la(a)(7)(B)(i) (1982). The 
FEC regulations go a step further and define payments made as a result of information 
received from the candidate about his contribution plans or needs. II C.F.R. 
§ 109.l(b)(4)(i)(A)(1982). See also infra note 117. For a more complete discussion of the 
1976 amendments see infra note 87. 
77. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 62-63 (1976). In addition to upholding the Act's 
contribution . limitations and declaring the expenditure limitations unconstitutional, the 
Court upheld the Act's disclosure and reporting provisions. Id at 64. Although these 
provisions do infringe on the privacy of associational rights guaranteed by the first 
amendment, the Court found three governmental interests compelling enough to over­
come the strict scrutiny test: 
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mittees concerned a portion of the Act which required disclosure of 
contributions and expenditures.78 While the Court noted that re­
quiring disclosure of contributions was sufficiently related to the 
Act's goals of preventing corruption the provisions requiring disclo­
sure of expenditures, if interpreted broadly, would require disclosure 
by those groups advocating specific issues as well as those supporting 
individual candidates.79 To avoid potential constitutional problems 
(I) they tell the public where the money is coming from, (2) they deter actual 
corruption and lessen the appearance of corruption by exposing large contribu­
tions and expenditures, and (3) they provide an essential means of determining 
violations of the statutes provisions. Id at 66-68. The Court, however, did note 
that there may be instances where the reporting and disclosure requirements 
may have such a chilling effect on a certain group that the organization would 
be exempt from these requirements. 
Id at 82 n.109. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee v. Fed­
eral Election Comm'n, 51 U.S.L.W. 4015 (1982) (Socialist Workers Party not required to 
disclose identity of contributors for to do so may subject them to threats, harassment and 
reprisals). Federal Election Comm'n v. Hall-Tyner Election Campaign Comm., 678 F.2d 
416 (2nd Cir. 1982) (Communist Party not obligated to comply with FECA's disclosure 
and reporting requirements). 
The public funding of Presidential campaigns was also upheld by the Buckley Court 
which noted that while acceptance of public funding required adherence to expenditure 
limitations, candidates are not required to accept public funding and, therefore, those 
who accept it must also accept any attached statutory restrictions. 424 U.S. at 57 n.65. 
The Buckley Court did, however, hold that the selection of the FEC commissioners 
did not adhere to the Constitutional requirements of the appointments clause. U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 2, c1.2. Thus, the commission, as presently constituted, could not exer­
cise the duties granted it. 424 U.S. at 143-44. 
78. 424 U.S. at 78-81. 
79. In determining that political committees must be narrowly interpreted so as to 
exclude issue groups, the Buckley Court relied on the holdings of two earlier lower court 
decisions. 424 U.S. at 79 n.l06 (citing United States v. National Committee for Impeach­
ment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2nd Cir. 1972), and American Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 
366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973) (three judge court), vacated as moot sub nom. Staats v. 
American Civil Liberties Union, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975». 
National Commilleefor Impeachment involved an advertisement in the New York 
Times entitled, "A Resolution to Impeach Richard M. Nixon as President of the United 
States." 469 F.2d at 1143. The advertisement was paid for by the National Committee 
for Impeachment and listed the officers and sponsors of the committee, as well as an 
"Honor Roll" comprised of congressmen and congresswomen who supported the resolu­
tion. The advertisement also included a request for contributions and specifically noted 
that money obtained would be used to support the election of congressmen and congress­
women who favored Nixon's impeachment. 469 F.2d at 1138. The Justice Department 
claimed that the advertisement was made and purchased for "the purpose of intluencing" 
the outcome of the 1972 presidential election and took action under the FECA of 1971 to 
require that the National Committee for Impeachment follow the disclosure provisions 
of the Act. Id The Second Circuit held that if such groups were considered political 
committees under the Act, then "serious constitutional issues" would be presented. Id at 
140. The court reasoned that if the government's position was adopted and the Act inter­
preted broadly, then every organization advocating an issue, from the Boy Scouts to the 
Golden Agers, would be required to register with the government as a political eommit­
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of requiring every type of group to disclose every type of expendi­
ture, the Court found that disclosure of expenditures by groups other 
than political committees or candidates must be narrowed to include 
only those expenditures for communications that expressly advocate 
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.80 This inter-
tee, and be subjected to the many filing and disclosure provisions of the Act. Thus, in an 
effort to narrow the definition of a political committee, the court interpreted the statute as 
requiring two tests to define the phrase "made for the purpose of influencing." Id at 
1141. The first test defined the phrase as including any "expenditure made with the 
authorization or consent, expressed or implied, or under the control; direct or indirect, of 
a candidate or his agents." Under the second test, the Act applied "only to committees 
soliciting contributions or expenditures the major purpose of which is the nomination or 
election or candidates." The second circuit concluded that the National Committee for 
Impeachment did not qualify as a political committee under either test because there 
existed no "connection whatsoever between the National Committee and any candidate," 
and "the major purpose of the advertisement was to promote the impeachment move­
ment and to condemn governmental policy on the Vietnam War, not to elect candidates." 
Id at 1141. While the National Committee for Impeachment failed to satisfy either test, 
the Second Circuit did not comment on whether satisfaction of only one test would qual­
ify the group as a political committee under the Act. Id See generally, Elections-Fed­
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971-A political committee is not required to disclose 
receipts, expenditures and names ofcontributors under the Federal Election Campaign Act 
of 1971, unless the major purpose of such a committee is the nomination or election of 
candidates and committee expenditures are authorized or controlled by a specific candidate, 
42 U. CIN. L. REV. 383 (1973) (an analysis of United States v. National Comm. for 
Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972), in which the author concludes that any 
group whose major purpose is to influence an election, not the nomination or election of 
a specific candidate, should be subject to the Act's provisions). 
The National Committee for Impeachment interpretation was approved in American 
Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings where an advertisement sponsored by the ACLU ex­
pressing opposition to- court-ordered busing was rejected by the New York Times be­
cause it did not contain the necessary identification required under the Act. 366 F. Supp. 
1041, 1050-51 (D.D.C. 1973), vacated as moot sub nom. Staats v. American Civil Liberties 
Union, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975). See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. The en­
forcement of the Act's disclosure provisions in the present instance, the court reasoned, 
would involve a chilling effect on the ACLU's rights. The court, therefore, adopted the 
narrow National Committee for Impeachment test and concluded that the activities did 
not satisfy either test. If the Act were to include the plaintiffs as a political committee, 
the resulting first amendment violations would necessitate an invalidation of the Act's 
disclosure provisions. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. at 1054-57. Thus, to sustain the disclosure 
provisions of Title III, political committees must be defined only in terms of the National 
Committee for Impeachment test. 
Both the National Committee for Impeachment and Jennings decisions are consistent 
with Buckley because both of the committees involved in those decisions were issue 
groups in which the potential for quidpro quo corruption was insufficient to justify the 
infringement on their first amendment rights. Draft committees, however, represent a 
different type of committee requiring a treatment distinguishable from that of the com­
mittees in National Committeefor Impeachment and Jennings. Classification of the Flor­
ida for Kennedy Committee and other draft committees as political committees may be 
accomplished, however, without violating the holdings or rationales of the two lower 
court cases and Buckley. See infra notes 112-37 and accompanying text. 
80. 424 U.S. at 80. 
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pretation would avoid first amendment problems of vagueness be­
cause only expenditures that expressly advocated a particular 
election result would necessitate disclosure.81 
In its discussion, the Court stipulated its interpretation of what 
constituted a political committee for purposes of the Act. As empha­
sized, the Court was concerned that the Act's contribution and ex­
penditure definitions were so vague as to include "issue groups."82 
They noted: 
The general requirement that "political committees" and can­
didates disclose their expenditures could raise similar vagueness 
problems, for "political committee" is defined only in terms of 
amount of annual "contributions" and "expenditures," and could 
be interpreted to reach groups engaged purely in issue discussion. 
The lower courts have construed the words "political committee" 
more narrowly. To fulfill the purposes of the Act they need only 
encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate 
or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a 
candidate. Expenditures of candidates and of "political commit­
tees" so construed can be assumed to fall within the core area 
sought to be addressed by Congress.83 
The Court's concern with the inclusion of issue groups is based on 
the fact that infringement upon a group's first amendment rights of 
political expression and association84 can only be justified if the 
means employed involve the compelling governmental interest of 
preventing quidpro quo corruption or the appearance of such cor­
ruption.85 Thus, the Buckley Court used the word "candidate" to 
81. ld. at 76-82. 
82. Ultimately, the Court struck down the expenditure limitations although they 
did uphold the Act's contribution limitations and disclosure provisions. See mpra notes 
71-77 and accompanying text. 
83. 424 U.S. at 79 (footnotes omitted). 
84. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. But see mpra notes 72-77 and ac­
companying text (infringement upon first amendment associational rights justifiable if a 
sufficiently compelling governmental interest exists). Federal Election Comm'n v. Na­
tional Right to Work Committee, 5 I U.S.L.W. 4037 (1982) (associational rights asserted 
are overridden by Congress' interests in enacting legislation which restricts some opera­
tions of segregated funds, solicitations of contributions by corporations in this instance, 
which must be limited to avoid actual or apparent corruption). 
85. 424 U.S. at 81. The Buckley Court also noted that not only had the contribu­
tion limitations been justified because of the potential quidpro quo corruption involved, 
but also contribution limitations are, in general, less restrictive of political activity than 
expenditure limitations. ld. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. See also, Citi­
zens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 301 (1981) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (contribution limitations are less restrictive of the first amendment right to 
political expression than are limitations on expenditures). 
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protect the first amendment rights of issue groups whose expendi­
tures contained little potential for the type ofquid pro quo corruption 
that the court believed was significant to justify infringement of the 
rights to free political expression and association. 
Therefore, the Buckley Court determined that there were two 
types of political groups. On the one hand, there are those commit­
tees that advocate and support particular issues. Under the Buckley 
rationale, these groups are not considered political committees 
within the meaning of the FECA. At the other extreme are those 
committees whose purpose is the election of an announced candi­
date. Such committees are clearly included under the express provi­
sion of the Act86 and their inclusion is justified by the compelling 
governmental interest of eliminating quidpro quo corruption.87 
4. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City ofBerkley 
The Buckley rationale for the different treatment regarding is­
sue and candidate group was echoed in another recent Supreme 
Court case involving election law: Citizens Against Rent Control v. 
City of Berkley.88 Citizens involved a city ordinance limiting the 
86. 424 u.s. at 81. Prior to the 1979 amendments, the FECA required "each treas­
urer of a political committee supporting a candidate or candidates for election to federal 
office," to report to the FEC. 2 U.S.c. § 434(a)(I) (1976) (amended version at 2 U.S.c. 
§ 434(a)(I) (1982». 
87. The decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), forced Congress to repeal 
the Act's unconstitutional provisions and to reappoint the FEC commissioners in accord­
ance with constitutional requirements. See supra note 77. In addition to these adjust­
ments, Congress also defined the role of and limitations on separate segregated funds 
established by corporations and labor unions now commonly referred to as political ac­
tion committees or Pacs. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(I)(C) (1982), see also supra note 45. The 
1976 revisions explicitly established a $5,000 per election limit on contributions to indi­
vidual Pacs and all Pacs administered by the same union or corporation were considered 
affiliated and treated as a single political committee. Corporations were allowed to solicit 
contributions only from stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and not 
all employees as was previously the case. Id. § 441(b). See International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Federal Election Comm'n, 678 F.2d 1092 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982) (en banc) affd mem., 103 S.Ct. 335 (1982) (upholding the constitutionality of 
the Act's provisions regulating the solicitation of funds by corporations and unions). 
Originally, Pacs represented only those political committees associated with labor 
unions or corporations. Today, however, the term Pac applies to almost every committee 
engaged in soliciting funds for political purposes. Ever since labor and corporate Pacs 
were authorized by Congress, they have become an increasingly important means of in­
fluence in political elections. They represent an effective means of utilizing campaign 
funds because they are well organized and administratively efficient. Ironically, it was 
the impact of labor and corporate wealth which Congress first tried to eliminate when it 
began regulating campaign financing. See supra notes 28-45 and accompanying text. 
88. 454 U.S. 290 (1981). For other cases examining the first amendment conse­
quences of contribution limitations in referendum campaigns, see First National Bank of 
571 1983] DRAFT COMMITTEES 
amount that an individual could contribute to a committee in sup­
port of, or in opposition to, ballot measures.89 The Court held that 
the ordinance violated the plaintiffs first amendment rights of polit­
ical expression and association.90 In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court noted that the corruption by potential large donors repre­
sented the only justification for allowing an infringement upon first 
amendment rights.91 Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the major­
ity, stated that "Buckley identified a single narrow exception to the 
rule that limits on political activity were contrary to the first amend­
ment. The exception relates to the perception of undue influence of 
large contributions to a candidate ."92 
Citizens is important for the purposes of this note because it ex­
emplifies the types of groups that the Buckley court was attempting 
to protect by narrowly defining a political committee.93 The activi­
ties of such groups exist only to advocate certain specific issues or 
ballot questions. They do not exist for the purpose of electing a spe­
cific individual. As the concurring opinion noted: 
In Buckley, this Court upheld limitations on contributions to 
candidates as necessary to prevent contributors from corrupting 
the representatives to whom the people have delegated political 
decisions. But curtailment of speech and association in a ballot 
measure campaign, where the people themselves render the ulti­
mate political decision, cannot be justified on this basis.94 
Infringement upon speech and associational rights simply can not be 
justified "in a ballot measure campaign, where the people themselves 
render the ultimate political decision" and the potential for corrup­
tion is not present.95 Further, the Citizens court explained that any 
corruption could be prevented, or at least discovered, by the city's 
disclosure ordinances.96 Under the Florida for Kennedy Committee 
opinion, not even this protective device would be available to regu-
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1976), and Let's Help Florida v. McCary, 621 F.2d 195 
(5th Cir. 1980). 
89. Id at 293. The amount was limited to $250 per contributor, yet the group 
collected $20,850 from only nine contributors, or $18,600 more than if none of the contri­
butions had exceeded $250. 
90. Id at 299. 
91. Id at 296-97. 
92. Id But see supra note 85. 
93. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text. 
94. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 302 (Blackmun & O'Connor, 11., 
. concurring). 
95. Id 
96. Id at 298. 
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late draft committees.97 
Thus, in defining a political committee for purposes of the 
FECA, the Supreme Court has created a distinction between those 
committees advocating particular issues and those supporting an­
nounced candidates. Draft committees, however, fall somewhere in 
between these two types of committees. A draft committee does 
more than advocate or support a particular issue, yet draft commit­
tees, by definition, do not support individuals who have officially an­
nounced their candidacy. Instead, draft committees seek to 
encourage an individual who is not yet an officially announced can­
didate for political office to become one. Once that individual does 
announce his candidacy, the draft committee ceases its activities.98 
5. 	 Federal Election Commission v. Machinists Non-Partisan 
Political League 
The first step in determining whether draft groups are political 
committees for purposes of the Act was taken by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Federal Election 
Commission v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League .99 The Ma­
chinists Non-Partisan Political League case evolved from the same 
Carter-Mondale complaint which initiated the FEC litigation 
against the Committee. loo Specifically, FEC believed that Machinists 
Non-Partisan Political League [MNPL] may have exceeded the con­
tribution limitations of the Act by its financial support of the alleg­
edly affiliated draft-Kennedy committees. 101 MNPL claimed, 
however, that none of the draft-Kennedy groups to which it contrib­
uted money, including the Committee, were political committees as 
defined by the Act, and thus, the FEC lacked subject matter jurisdic­
tion necessary to conduct the investigation. 102 The issue, therefore, 
was whether draft committees, such as the Committee, were political 
committees under the FECA. 
Before reaching a decision on the FEC's jurisdiction over draft 
groups, the Machinists Non-Partisan Political League court deter­
97. The Florida for Kennedy Comm. court found that draft committees were not 
subject to either the contribution limitations nor the disclosure provisions of the Act. 
The 1979 amendments, however, have since required draft committees to report to the 
FEC, although they are still not bound by the contribution limitations. See infra note 
III and accompanying text. 
98. 	 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. 
99. 	 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cerro denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). 
100. 	 See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text. 
101. 	 655 F.2d at 383. 
102. 	 Id at 390. 
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mined that the district court had erred in enforcing the FEC sub­
poena against MNPL. 103 The court then held that draft committees 
were not subject to the Act's provisions. I04 
Citing Buckley, the Machinists Non-Partisan Political League 
court held that the Act only encompassed those "organizations that 
{were} under the control ofa candidate or the major purpose of which 
{was} the nomination or election of a candidate."lOs Because draft 
committees do not support a "candidate", they are o~tside of the 
Act's restrictions. The Machinists Non-Partisan Political League 
court refused to extend the Buckley definition to include draft com­
mittees. They noted that the only justification in Buckley for up­
holding the Act's contribution limitations, given the fundamental 
first amendment activities involved, was the elimination of the actual 
or apparent corruption that exists between large contributors and 
candidates. 106 Furthermore, Buckley requires that the "actuality and 
potential for corruption" be identifiable. 107 The Machinists Non-Par­
tisan Political League court, however, concluded that this type of po­
tential or actual corruption is not identifiable with draft groups 
because draft groups may exist for the purpose of encouraging a 
whole field of candidates rather than just a single individual. I08 
Although relying primarily on Buckley, the Machinists Non-Par­
tisan Political League court also noted that a reading of the statutory 
language and legislative history of the FECA,I09 the FEe's treat­
103. Id 
104. Id at 396. 
105. Id at 391 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 79 (1976» (emphasis in 
original). 
106. Id at 392. 
107. Id 
108. Id 
109. The Machinists Non-Partisan Political League court conceded that the lack of 
any specific mention of draft committees prior to 1979 was not surprising because such 
groups, until recently, were a relatively unknown phenomenon in the federal campaign 
process. 655 F.2d at 394. Congressional silence with regard to these groups, however, 
does not necessarily indicate a Congressional intent to exclude them from the statutory 
restrictions. This is especially true where the overall purpose and intention of Congress 
in enacting the FECA and the plain language of the Act's provisions are circumvented by 
such a technical omission. For instance, in Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945), the 
Court upheld a labor department restriction disallowing the use of "industrial home­
work" to circumvent the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
even though the statute made no reference to "industrial homework." 324 U.S. at 263. 
The Court gave no weight to the statutory omission because the statute's purpose and 
language were designed to prevent such circumvention of the mandated guidelines. Id 
at 259-63. The omission of draft committees from the FECA's provisions provides an 
analogous situation which dictates an analogous result under F70rida for Kennedy 
Comm., 681 F.2d at 1292 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
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ment of draft committees,IlO and the 1979 amendments to the 
FECA, III supported their conclusion that draft committees were not 
110. The Machinists Non-Partisan Political League court also noted that the FEC 
did not consider draft committees to be political committees and, therefore, they were not 
subject to the Act's provisions. 655 F.2d at 395. The court cited the FEC's 1975-1979 
annual reports which have consistently recommended to Congress that draft committees 
should be subject to the Act's contribution limitations and reporting provisions. Id The 
annual reports reveal that the FEC has always considered draft committees to be polit­
ical committees and subject to the contribution limitations. See, e.g., 1975 FED. ELEC­
TION COMM'N ANN. REP. 79. The FEC was concerned that the contribution limits which 
apply to draft committees should be the same as those applying to committees supporting 
a candidate. As noted earlier, draft committees were allowed higher contribution limita­
tions than candidate committees. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. These 
recommendations do not demonstrate that the commission believed draft committees fell 
outside of the Act's restrictions, but rather they indicate the opposite result: that draft 
groups were always considered by the FEC to be subject to the Act's provisions. 
Although the FEC has always considered draft committees to be subject to the dis­
closure provisions of the Act, early in its existence, it did ask Congress to affirm that 
proposition. 1976 FED. ELECTION COMM'N ANN. REP. at 75-6. Because Congress re­
mained silent until the 1979 amendments, the FEC has always felt that draft committees 
were subject to the disclosure requirements. This fact is evidenced by an FEC advisory 
opinion submitted to the National Committee for a Democratic Alternative: a draft 
Kennedy group. The opinion stated that: 
A group soliciting funds and making expenditures which are expected to 
be in excess of $1,000 for 1979, as would appear to be the case of the Commit­
tee, would qualify as a political committee for purposes of the Act and is subject 
to all registration and reporting requirements as well as all other provisions of 
the Act. 
1979-41 FEC Advisory Opinion 3 (1979), summarized in, 1979 FED. ELECTION COMM'N 
ANN. REp. 8. 
Ill. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d at 394-95. The 1979 
amendments were generally designed to be "non-controversial." H. ALEXANDER, supra 
note 29, at 37. The basic purposes were: to simplify the Act's recording and record 
keeping provisions; increase the role of state and local political parties; reduce the proce­
dural requirements of the enforcement process; and, provide increased opportunity for 
respondents to present their defenses. Id In the 1979 amendments, however, Congress 
did adopt the FEC's recommendation that draft committees be subject to the Act's dis­
closure provisions. H.R. REp. No. 96-422, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1979 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2860. 
The Machinists Non-Partisan Political League court noted that this addition demon­
strated that Congress did not consider draft committees subject to the Act's provisions 
and now desired them to be only subject to the disclosure provisions. 655 F.2d at 394-96. 
The legislative history of the 1979 amendments, however, indicates that Congress consid­
ered draft committees to be subject to the Act's jurisdiction prior to 1979. Brief for Ap­
pellee at 16, Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d 1281 
(11th Cir. 1982). The change was made simply to insure that draft committees report. It 
does not indicate that they were considered exempt from all of the Act's provisions. 
In addition, Congress' failure to specifically require draft committees to be subject to 
certain contribution limits, does not automatically demonstrate that Congress did not 
consider and did not want draft groups subject to the contribution limits. Rather, this 
omission can be read as a demonstration of agreement concerning FEC's present han­
dling of the matter. For instance, Congress may feel that draft groups should have 
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political committees. Because draft committees were not subject to 
the Act's provisions, the FEC could not investigate the activities of 
MNPL regarding the draft-Kennedy groups. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. 	 The Presence of Quid Pro Quo Corruption and Draft 
Commitiees 
In Floridalor Kennedy Committee, the eleventh circuit held that 
draft committees were not subject to the FECA's restrictions because 
draft committees did not support a clearly identified candidate. I 12 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Florida lor Kennedy Committee court 
based its conclusion upon the definition of a political committee 
enunciated in Buckley and adopted by the Machinists Non-Partisan 
Political League court. 113 
As previously noted, an important aspect of the Buckley deci­
sion concerned the presence of, or even the appearance of, qUidpro 
quo corruption in the political process. It is only when this corrup­
tion is present that limitations on political activity can be justified, 
despite the infringement upon first amendment rights which result 
from such restrictions. I 14 The absence of such corruption with issues 
and referenda groups led the Court to narrowly define political com­
mittee so as to exclude these groups from the FECA's restrictions. 115 
Draft committees, such as FKC, however, should not be excluded 
from the FECA's restrictions because they do, in fact, present the 
same potential for corruption as candidate committees. The conclu­
sion by Machinists Non-Partisan Political League that the "actuality 
and potential for corruption" is not "identifiable" with draft commit­
tees because draft groups may exist for the purpose of encouraging a 
whole field of candidates rather than a single individual, 116 over­
looks the facts of the two cases. Both MNPL and the Committee 
were concerned with nomination of a single individual, and as such, 
higher limitations than those supporting a candidate due to the importance of early 
money and exposure to a campaign, particularly when there still exists some doubt as to 
whether the individual will actually run or not. If Congress felt that the current direction 
of the FEC in this area was incorrect or that additional clarification was necessary, it 
could have specifically changed the provisions involved. Absent such a change, the 
FEC's treatment of draft committees should remain intact. 
112. 	 681 F.2d at 1288. 
113. 	 Id at 1287. 
114. 	 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. 
115. 	 See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text. 
116. 	 Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d at 392. 
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the potential for quidpro quo corruption between Senator Kennedy 
and these groups did exist. 
The significant connection between the Committee and Senator 
Kennedy can be demonstrated in a variety of ways. \17 The two most 
obvious connections are the committee's name and its stated purpose 
of causing Senator Kennedy to accept the Democratic Nomination 
to the office of the President. lls Further evidence of an identifiable 
connection involves an FEC advisory opinion. 119 In this opinion, 
several officers and personnel of the Virginia Democrats for Leader­
ship and Commitment, a draft-Kennedy committee, asked if they 
could communicate and cooperate with the Kennedy Presidential 
Campaign without causing the draft committee to be related to the 
Kennedy campaign committee for purposes of the Act's require­
ments.120 The FEC ruled that as long as the draft committee had 
become inactive (Kennedy having declared his candidacy) and the 
individuals would not be simultaneously working for both groups, 
the individuals could indeed participate in the Kennedy campaign 
without connecting the draft group to any of the restrictions for can­
didate committees. l2l Similarly, individuals who contributed to 
draft-Kennedy groups were also likely to be the same individuals 
contributing to his campaign. 122 Thus, the Committee and the other 
117. The issue of how clearly an independent group is connected with a candidate 
or potential candidate has also been discussed in relation to independent expenditures. 
For example, on September 26, 1980 Common Cause filed a complaint with the FEC 
alleging that a certain group supporting Ronald Reagan was not really independent of 
his campaign committee. In the complaint, Common Cause submitted the following fac­
tors to be used in determining when a group's expenditures are really separate from, and 
uncoordianted with, an individual's campaign: 
-membership of committees and steering bodies; 
-conscious parallelism of activities; 
-indirect communications; 
-interlocking consultants, vendors, and suppliers; 
-coordinated events; 
-use of candidate's name; and 
-use of material provided by a candidate. 
Wertheimer & Huwa, Campaign Finance Reforms: Past Accomplishments, Future Chal­
lenges, 10 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 43,64 n.198 (1980-81). See also Note, Mak­
ing Campaign Finance Law Enforceable: Closing the Independent Expenditure Loophole, 
15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 363 (1982). See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
118. Brief of Appellant at 2, Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy 
Comm., 681 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir. 1982). See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
119. 1979-65 FEC Advisory Opinion, 1-3 (1979), summarized in, 1979 FEC ANN. 
REp. 9. 
120. 1979-65 FEC Advisory Opinion (1979), summarized in, 1979 FED. ELECTION 
COMM'N ANN. REp. 83. 
121. Id. 
122. 1980-81 FEC Advisory Opinion, 1-3 (1980), summarized in, 1980 FED. ELEC­
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draft-Kennedy groups would seem to be clearly identified with Sena­
tor Kennedy regardless of the technical status, of his candidacy. 
The group's close identity with Senator Kennedy and his subse­
quent campaign organization seems to indicate the potential for the 
very same type of qUidpro quo corruption that concerned the Buck­
ley Court.123 The fact that an individual has not yet officially de­
clared his candidacy does not significantly diminish the potential of 
a large contributor being rewarded for his efforts. The only differ­
ence is that the contribution is a little riskier because the possibility 
exists that the candidate may ultimately choose not to run. 
An office seeker would be extremely indebted to a person who 
contributed to a draft committee, especially when, under the Florida 
for Kennedy Committee opinion, an unlimited amount could be con­
tributed. For if the office seeker does announce his candidacy, the 
contributor has provided an opportunity for the candidate to receive 
valuable early exposure. Such initial exposure can be particularly 
important given the present Presidential primary system in which 
success in an early primary may be instrumental in assisting the can­
didate in raising the necessary funds for later primaries. 124 As the 
FEC has stated, "the very essence of a draft committee is to influence 
the nomination of a person to federal office. It stretches credibility 
to argue, as [the Committee] does, that attempting to influence some­
one to become a candidate is not an attempt to influence that per­
son's nomination for election."125 A similar conclusion was reached 
by the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia, which 
stated: 
[This] court could not, merely on the basis of the [the Commit­
tee's] assertions, definitively hold that Senator Kennedy was never 
a "candidate" until his public announcement. Nor could it hold 
that the activities of the various draft committees were efforts 
solely to convince the Senator to run, rather than help elect him. 
These issues would require a factual investigation very much 
nON COMM'N ANN. REP. 101 (determining whether a certain individual's contributions 
made to a draft committee count against his $25,000 aggregate limit in 1979 or his 1980 
limit, both contributions going to pro-Kennedy groups). See a/so, Ifshin & Warin, supra 
note 6 at 509 n.167 (Kennedy fundraising efforts were impaired because many contribu­
tors were unsure whether contributions to draft committees counted as contributions to 
Kennedy's campaign committee). 
123. 681 F.2d at 1293 (Clark, J., dissenting). See supra notes 72-76 and accompa­
nying text. 
124. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 20. 
125. Brief for Appellee at 14, Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy 
Comm., 681 F.2d 1281 (lIth Cir. 1982). 
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along the lines which the Commission [FEC] proposes to 
follow. 126 
Thus, the Florida for Kennedy Committee opinion provides a 
mechanism for the type of unlimited contributions that the FECA 
sought to avoid. 127 This fact is particularly disturbing because the 
contribution limitations of the Act have succeeded in reducing the 
influence of "big-givers."128 By contributing unlimited amounts to 
draft committees, these individuals can once again yield substantial 
influence in political campaigns. 
B. 	 Draft Committees and the First Amendment Right of 
Association 
A discussion of the First Amendment right of association also 
clarifies the difference between draft committees and issue or refer­
enda groups. The Florida for Kennedy Committee court expressed 
the belief that serious constitutional questions would arise if draft 
groups such as the Committee were subject to the Act's require­
ments.129 This concern, also expressed in the Buckley decision,I3O is 
not present with the draft-Kennedy groups. These groups do not 
involve the potential chilling effect that is present in issue or candi­
date groups that support candidates or political views outside those 
126. Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 492 F. Supp. 587, 
595 (S.D. Fla. 1980). 
127. This rational is furthered demonstrated by a 1979 FEC advisory opinion. The 
opinion allows an individual to form his own committee to "test the waters" regarding 
his chances for success, and allows the committee to be exempt from the Act's restrictions 
on political committees. The ruling, however, points out that if the individual does offi­
cially declare his candidacy, contributions given to his earlier committee must be subse­
quently disclosed and will count against the contribution limitations of his supporters. 
This eliminates any chance of a person contributing over the Act's limits. 1979-26 FEC 
Advisory Opinion 1-3 (l979), summarized in, 1978 FED. ELECTION COMM. ANN. REP. 75. 
128. 	 H. ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 64. 
129. Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d 1281, 
1287-88 (1982). The majority cites the case of EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theologi­
cal Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 285 (5th Cir. 1981), for the proposition that ambiguous stat­
utes which present a significant risk that a first amendment right will be infringed, must 
be construed narrowly, in such a manner so as to avoid such potential constitutional 
problems. Id at 1287. Based on this interpretation they conclude that the FECA should 
be read as excluding the Committee and other draft committees to avoid creating any 
constitutional problems. Id at 1287-88. This determination misses the mark for two 
reasons. First, the statute is not ambiguous, see infra notes 138-144 and accompanying 
text. Second, enforcement of the statute poses no threat to the committee's constitutional 
rights. 681 F.2d· at 1291 (Clark, J., dissenting); see infra notes 130-33 and accompanying 
text. 
130. 	 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
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of the mainstream of American politics. As the Floridafor Kennedy 
Committee dissent explains: 
The appellant [the Committee] has not raised even a colora­
ble associational freedom claim. It was supporting the candidacy 
of an individual who narrowly lost the presidential nomination of 
one of the two major parties. No stigma could be attached to such 
efforts. Fear of a "chilling effect" upon such committees is simply 
so wild as to be baseless. The appellant has brought forth no facts 
or reasons which demonstrate how a "chilling effect" would come 
about. Thus, the threshold requirements of an associational rights 
claim have not been met in the instant case, as no reasonable like­
lihood that political association will be discouraged has been 
established. 131 
Even if Florida for Kennedy Committee were able to demonstrate a 
colorable associational claim, such infringement must be balanced 
against the compelling governmental interest of preventing 
corruption. 132 
These two factors, the potential for corruption and relatively 
minor infringements on associational rights, tend to severely weaken 
the FlOridafor Kennedy Committee court's claim that the Act must be 
read as excluding draft committees in order to avoid constitutional 
problems. The problems feared simply do not exist in the present 
situation. 133 
Thus, given the concerns of the Buckley Court, in excluding is­
sue groups from the Act and including those supporting a candidate, 
draft committees should be accorded the same treatment as the latter 
groups. Buckley was concerned only with excluding issue groups 
whose first amendment rights of political expression would be vio­
lated if subject to the Act's provisions or fringe-political groups 
whose first amendment right to association might also be infringed. 
The Buckley Court did not intend to omit all groups that did not 
support an officially announced candidate from the Act's restric­
tions. 134 The mere fact that a group is not sponsoring a candidate, in 
the technical sense, does not mean that the purposes that caused the 
131. 681 F.2d at 1294 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
132. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
133. 681 F.2d at 1294-95 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
134. The Buckley court in dicta implied that not all political committees would 
require the presence of a candidate to be subject to the Act's provisions. In a footnote, 
they stated that "[s]ome partisan committees-groups within the control of a candidate 
or [those]primanry organized/or political activities" ... will be subject to the disclosure 
provisions of the Act. 424 U.S. at 80 n.107 (emphasis supplied). Because the Committee 
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Court to narrowly define political committee, exist in draft commit­
tees. 135 Adhering to such a restrictive interpretation would not only 
fail to satisfy the concerns of Buckley, the elimintation of quid pro 
quo corruption,136 but also would defeat much of Congress' inten­
tion in implementing the FECA. 137 . 
C. 	 Statutory J)efinition and Legislative History of UPolitical 
Committee" 
Since the Buckley decision did not warrant the conclusion 
reached by the Floridafor Kennedy Committee court, what that court 
termed "FEC's technical argument," utilizing the plain language of 
the statute, becomes increasingly important. The Act defines a polit­
ical committee as a committee which receives contributions or makes 
expenditures in excess of $1,000 per year.I38 The key elements in 
defining a political committee are expenditures l39 and contribu­
tions. l40 Both are defined in terms of making payments "for the pur­
is primarily organized for the purpose of electing an individual to political office, it 
would seem to represent the type of "other partisan committee" discussed by the court. 
Also, in accepting the restrictive interpretation of the earlier lower courts, Buckley 
used the words "nonpartisan organizations" in describing political committees which 
were outside the Act's provisions, as opposed to excluding committees which did not 
support a "clearly identified candidate." 424 U.S. at 79 n.I06. This could imply that the 
court did not want to define political committees as only those groups supporting a can­
didate. Additional support for a broader definition of political committee by the Court 
can be inferred from their statement that "dollars given to another person or organiza­
tion that are earmarked for political purposes are contributions under the Act." Id at 24 
n.24. Under this definition, the Committee would seem to qualify as a political commit­
tee. 
Furthermore, an argument can be made that the Buckley court in defining political 
committee, did not use the word candidate in the technical FECA sense, but rather it was 
to be given its broader every day meaning. 681 F.2d at 1292 (Clark, J., dissenting). The 
Floridafor Kennedy Comm. dissenting opinion reaches this conclusion through two ob­
servations. First, the Buckley court consistently used words such as "clearly identified" 
and "particularly Federal" to modify the word candidate. If the technical definition of 
candidate was intended, the use of these additional words would have been unnecessary. 
Secondly, the Court placed words likepolitical committee, expenditure and contribution in 
quotes when referring to their technical FECA definition. The word candidate never 
appeared in quotes. Id at 1292-93 (Clark, J., dissenting). This broader reading of the 
term candidate would cause draft committees to be covered by the Act, because the Buck­
ley Court only intended to trim the vague fringe areas of the statute which would involve 
constitutional violations while still maintaining what it considered the core of the Act. 
Id at 1293 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
135. 	 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
136. 	 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
137. 	 See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text. 
138. 	 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
139. 	 2 U.S.C. § 43 I (9)(A) (1982). 
140. 	 Id § 43 I (8)(A) (1982). 
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pose of influencing the election [of any person] for Federal office." 141 
The use of "person" rather than "candidate" represents a conscious 
choice by Congress to give the FEC authority over all types of 
groups whose purpose is to influence federal elections. 142 
The legislative history of the term political committee and gen­
eral canons of statutory construction support this broad interpreta­
tion. The House of Representatives defined a political committee as 
"any committee, association or organization which accepts contribu­
tions or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing or at­
tempting to influence the election of one or more candidates for 
Federal elective office."143 The bill, as passed however, did not con­
tain the word candidate. 144 Congress, thus, impliedly rejected a leg­
islative proposal that would have limited political committees solely 
to those supporting a candidate. 
In addition, the Supreme Court has consistently stated that "the 
starting point in every case of statutory interpretation is 'the actual 
language employed by Congress.' "145 This general principle of stat­
utory construction was recently employed by the Supreme Court in 
another election law case, Bread Political Action Committee v. 
FECI46 In Bread Political Action Committee, the Court noted that 
absent a "clearly expressed legislative intention" to the contrary, the 
plain language of the statute was controlling. 147 In the present case, 
not only is there no legislative history to the contrary, but the legisla­
tive history actually supports inclusion of draft committees into the 
Act. 
Therefore, both a review of the relevant legislative history and 
141. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A), (9)(A) (1982) (emphasis supplied). 
142. 681 F.2d at 1290-91 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
143. H.R. Doc. No. 11060, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 3 (1971). The definitions of 
contribution and expenditure were slightly revised by the 1980 amendments. The most 
recent definitions eliminate the phrase "of any person" and replace it with "for the pur­
pose ofinfiuencing any election for Federal office." 2 U.S.C. § 43 I (8)(A), (9)(A) (1982). 
Although these changes do not alter the main thrust of the Act, they do demonstrate 
Congress' intent to regulate those contributions and expenditures designed to impact on 
federal elections. Floridafor Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d at 1289 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
144. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
145. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit at 6 n.6, Federal Election Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Parti­
san Political League, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing CBS, Inc. v. Federal Commu­
nications Comm'n, 453 U.S. 367,385 (1981), quoting Reiter v. Sonotone, 422 U.S. 330, 
337 (1979». 
146. 455 U.S. 577 (1982). 
147. Id at 581. 
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general canons of statutory construction support the view that Con­
gress intended draft committees to be subject to the Act's restrictions. 
v. EFFECT AND IMPACT OF THE FKC DECISION 
Under the 1979 Amendments to the FECA, draft committees 
are subject to the Act's disclosure requirements. Floridafor Kennedy 
Committee and Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, however, 
indicate that because draft committees are not political committees, 
such groups are not subject to the Act's contribution limitations. 148 
The Supreme Court's refusal of the Machinists Non-Partisan League 
petition, along with the lack of further Congressional action,149 indi­
cates that the present situation will remain. For these reasons, an 
analysis of the effect of the exclusion of draft committees from many 
of the Act's requirements is appropriate. 
While draft committees are a relatively new phenomenon used 
extensively in only Presidential elections, there is reason to believe 
that their presence in all elections will increase. Furthermore, the 
adoption of the Presidential primary system with its public funding 
and expenditure limitations has increased the number of potential 
candidates actively seeking their party's nominations. ISO Utilization 
of draft committees has increased accordingly. Because draft com­
mittees are not under FEC jurisdiction, many of the problems and 
issues regarding draft committees will remain unanswered,lsl thus 
providing a vehicle for circumvention of many of the Act's require­
ments. There is a potential for qUid pro quo corruption between 
draft groups and the individual. ls2 The FEC's petition of the Ma­
chinists Non-Partisan Political League decision, however, briefly 
highlights the potential scenario: 
Draft committees, not subject to FECA's contribution limitations, 
will have the potential of funnelling large aggregations of money, 
including corporate and union treasury funds, into federal cam­
paigns. Such committees, able to accept unlimited funds, will be 
in direct competition with those committees supporting candi­
148. Machinists Non-Partisan Political Comm., 655 F.2d at 396 (the court admitted 
that the post 1979 treatment of draft groups is unclear). 
149. Three bills were introduced during the 97th Congress which would subject 
draft committees to the contribution limits of the Act: S. 1851, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1981), S. 1899, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) and H.R. 6479, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982). 
Extensive hearings were held on S. 1851 which discussed the Act's applicability to draft 
committees. The hearings, however, have not resulted in subsequent legislation. 
ISO. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 135. 

lSI. Ifshin & Warin, supra note 6, at 513. 

152. See supra notes 112-28 and accompanying text. 
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dates. A .proliferation of draft committees will severely damage 

. the statutory scheme enacted by Congress and may completely 

circumvent the provisions of FECA. Such a result was certainly 

not the intent of Congress when it enacted FECA, and the appel­
late court's judgments facilitating this result must be reversed. 15) 

Certainly, potential office seekers are not hesitant to take advan­
tage of such a situation. For instance, during the 1972 Presidential 
campaign, Richard Nixon received a substantial percentage of his 
contributions, particularly from business and wealthy individuals, 
before the disclosure provisions of the 1971 Act became effective. 
Although the disclosure and reporting requirements of the 1979 
Amendments may prevent some individuals from contributing large 
amounts,IS4 the Buckley Court noted that disclosure alone was insuf­
ficient to preserve the integrity of the system. 155 The necessity of 
contribution limitations to preserve the FECA's statutory scheme is 
evidenced by the Machinists Non-Partisn Political League decision 
which allows business and labor political action committees (com­
monly referred to as Pacs) to contribute unlimited amounts to draft 
committees. It should be remembered that the potential influence of 
such large aggregations of capital first prompted government regula­
tion of federal campaigns back in the early 1900's. 
Furthermore, the extensive role of Pacs, even in areas where 
they are regulated, has been criticized by numerous commenta­
tors. IS6 Much of this criticism has centered around two factors. The 
first criticism is that while contribution limitations have minimized 
the influence of the "big-givers", the money has simply shifted to 
Pacs where the contribution limitations are slightly higher and the 
153. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit at 5-6, Federal Election Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Parti­
san Political League, 655 F.2d 380 (D.c. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). 
154. In addition to eliminating the potential for quid pro quo corruption, contribu­
tion limitations also support the "one-man, one-vote" principle: each individual should 
be able to influence federal elections only to the extent of the next, just as each individ­
ual's vote should count equally. Large unlimited contributions, however, enable some 
individuals to exhibit a disproportionate amount of infiuence. D. ADAMANY & G. 
AGREE, supra note 44, at 185. See also Wright, Money and the Pollution ofPolitics: Is the 
First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1982). 
ISS. California Medical Association v. Federal Election Comm'n, 641 F.2d 619 
(9th Cir. 1981) (en bane), affd, 453 U.S. 182, 199-200 n.20 (1981) (citing Buckley v. 
Yaleo, 424 U.S. I, 27-28 (1976». 
156. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 146-47; Wright, supra note 154, at 614-20. 
See generally, Adamany, PACS and the Democratic Financing ofPolitics, 22 ARIZ. L. 
REv. 569 (1980). 
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groups more capable of spending the money effectively. 157 A second 
criticism of the Pac phenomenon involves the connection between a 
Pac's contributions and expenditures and the subsequent votes of 
Congressmen who were the beneficiaries of these efforts~xactly the 
type of corruption feared in Buckley. 158 
Pacs, however, have been only a minor participant in Presiden­
tial elections. 159 This is probably due to the presence of public fund­
ing in Presidential elections. Because funds are provided for both 
general elections and primaries, Pac money is not as essential to a 
Presidential office seeker as it is to congressional and senatorial can­
didates, who have no public funding available and no expenditure 
limitS.I60 The Florida for Kennedy Committee ruling, however, cre­
ates a situation by which Pacs can have a substantial impact upon 
Presidential campaigns. They can contribute millions of dollars to 
those draft committees supporting individuals whose policies they 
favor and nothing to those they oppose. The influx of such poten­
tially large funds will provide important seed money and early expo­
sure to certain office seekers, creating a potentially crippling 
disadvantage for those who do not favor Pac concems. 161 
The Florida for Kennedy Committee decision thus provides a 
complete mechanism by which FECA requirements can be legally 
circumvented. At a time when the average contribution to a Presi­
dential candidate is $27.50, the doors are now open for contributions 
resembling the 2 million dollars given by W. Clement Stone to Rich­
ard Nixon in 1972.162 The only condition to such a gift is that it take 
place before an mdividual officially declares his candidacy. Unlim­
ited contributions to draft committees also provide for an increase in 
157. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 66. See also Cox, Constitutional Issues in the 
Regulation ofthe Financing ofElection Campaigns, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 395, 399 (1982). 
158. Running with the PAC's, TIME MAG., Oct. 25, 1982 at 20. While many Pacs 
may be considered issue groups and thus, protected by the Buckley, National Commillee 
for Impeachment and Jennings rationales, others support specific individuals. Excluding 
these latter types, such as the Committee, from the Act's provisions enables them to 
spend substantial sums of money simply because the individuals they support are not 
announced candidates. If draft committees were considered political committees under 
the Act, the amount which these groups could contribute would be limited, and thus, 
their impact lessened. 
159. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 29 at 86. 
160. Id at 147. 
161. The assumption that individuals not supported by corporate Pacs will receive 
funds from labor Pacs is not always valid for both groups often support the same individ­
ual, thus placing their opponent at a substantial financial disadvantage. Adamany, supra 
note 154 at 591. 
162. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 29 at 96. 
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corporate and labor influence in the election process-the type of 
situation the Act was designed to eliminate. 
Even while subjected to a $5,000 contribution limitation, Florida 
for Kennedy Committee still amassed a total of $267,018 163 and it 
represented only one of nine draft-Kennedy groups. Without such 
limits, one can only speculate on the potential accumulation of such 
groups. The creation of such a situation surely does not represent 
the intentions of Congress in enacting the FECA, yet it is precisely 
the scenario that the Florida for Kennedy Committee decision has 
created. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Efforts to regulate the influence of affluent interests in federal 
elections have not always been successful. The complete elimination 
of corruption in federal elections can probably never be achieved, at 
least not without destroying the fundamental values of political ex­
pression and association guaranteed by the first amendment. Yet 
Congress, in enacting the FECA, has succeeded in at least closing 
some of the loopholes that existed in earlier efforts to regulate fed­
eral elections. The Florida for Kennedy Committee decision, how­
ever, provided a new loophole through which the intentions and 
purposes of Congress' efforts can be completely circumvented. 
Excluding draft committees from the Act's provisions cannot be 
justified by a reading of the appropriate statutory provisions in­
volved. Nor does the opinion in Buckley mandate the decision by 
the eleventh circuit in Floridafor Kennedy Committee. To avoid cir­
cumvention of the FECA, that decision should be re-examined. 
Kenneth R. Plumb 
163. Brieffor Appellee at 2 n.l., Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy 
Comm., 681 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir. 1982). 
